COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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" I perfectly concur with my noble friend (Lord Hawkesbury) in thinking that we ought to guard, with " great care, against any tendency to *increase* the *colonial system* of this country."—MR. ADDINGTON'S SPEECH, NOV. 3, 1801. VIDE REGISTER, VOL II. p. 1149.——" If I were called upon to say, what " would have the greatest effect in *restoring our influence on the Continent*, I should say: *give back to France* " *her colonial possessions.*"—LORD CASTLEREAGH'S SPEECH, MAY 14, 1802. VIDE REGISTER, VOL. II. p. 1333.——" This day, at twelve o'clock, the Park and Tower guns were fired, while other demon- " strations of *joy* took place, in consequence of the *capture of the French Island of St. Lucia!!!*"—LONDON NEWS, JULY 30, 1803.

INQUISITOR.

July 23, 1803.

LETTER V.

DEAR SIR,—— In my letter of last week, I indicated to you somewhat at length the mode which I should be desirous of pursuing for asserting the claim of the King of France, and for re-establishing him on his throne.——That mode is the most open and unequivocal, that could be devised; and, I wish it to be of that description, as being the most honourable, and at the same time the most efficacious —I believe, I have, in a former letter, adduced some reasons which make me believe that our sincerity may very reasonably be doubted, if we have any thing in the slightest degree less plain and less clear than it is possible to make it; and, if our sincerity is doubted, we shall have no co-operation from those who must be the principal actors, and on whom the work chiefly depends.——The French Royalists having once taken up arms, and having been excited to persevere in the contest by our assurance of support and assistance; having been, after that, abandoned completely at the peace of Amiens; it is not to be expected or hoped, that those who have survived the butcheries, the deportations, and all the vexations that have ever since been putting into execution against them, should be very zealous to expose themselves to a renewal of similar labours, and similar sufferings, without some reasonable assurance, that they will not again be thus scandalously given up into the hands of their cruel and mortal enemies. On this ground, I think it is of absolute necessity, that the plan, if undertaken, should be confessed openly, and proclaimed to the world as loudly and as distinctly as possible. On the other ground, of the glory of the achievement, I think it no less essential. We want that glory to re-establish our character, which, whether justly or unjustly, I shall not now argue, but which is blasted in the opinion of all Europe; we want it to regain their confidence; we want it as a means of strength and resistance against our enemies.—For national honour and glory is not a mere empty bubble, as many now a-day profess to think it.—It is a positive source of strength and power in the hands of those who know how to use it.—It is a weapon well suited for offence, but of wonderful efficacy and force in defence.—Not in that sort of defence which now seems the fashion, and which consists in repelling the enemy, whom you have suffered to come and attack you; but in that, which is, I think, infinitely preferable, namely, an endeavour to make the enemy afraid of even attempting to attack you.—In this point of view, I should conceive, that a little glory would not be unacceptable to his Majesty's ministers at the present moment.—For my own part too, I should wish the country to be treated with the acquisition of this glory, in hopes, that as they have not been much indulged of late in any thing of the sort, they may become captivated with it, as children are with a new play-thing; and learn at last to amuse themselves with something more substantial, more really worthy of them, than the glory of the " Magnifi- " cent Receipts" at the Custom-House, and of their " commercial greatness."——For the above reasons it is, that while I recommend and urge most strongly an attempt to re-establish monarchy in France, in the person of the legitimate Sovereign of that country, Lewis XVIII. I must deprecate any attempt of the sort by underhand means —I have heard that money might do it——I doubt it altogether.—But, admitting for a moment that it might, and which I only do for argument's sake.—I should prefer the other mode—1st. on account of the honour attending that mode, which must necessarily be entirely lost if this one be adopted—2d. because, at all events, from the nature of it, it could not be so effectual for the peace and repose of Europe.—My plan of a congress, as mentioned in my last, for arranging the balance of power in Europe, must

of course fall to the ground, and we should have at least Lewis XVIII. with all Buonaparté's power, instead of Buonaparté; a most desirable change no doubt; but which would not, to my mind, be quite sufficient. I do not wish to see Lewis XVIII. wielding so immense a power as that of the First Consul.——For the liberties of Europe I deprecate it.—And for the sake of the kingly cause, the cause of justice against fraud, the cause of lawful claims against usurped ones.—I hope not to see that Monarch extending his dominion over countries added to his empire by treachery, fraud, and villany.——3d. On account of the dangers of the plan. These are in truth so many and so great, that I doubt whether they would not altogether be an absolute impediment to it.——In my mind they are such, that I certainly would not choose to adopt any plan subject to them; and, I think, no reasonable man would.——Let us consider a little what they are. In the first place there is the danger of a discovery.—Any event of that sort would be of course fatal to those whose assistance may thus have been gained; and this to an honourable mind would be sufficient, I should imagine, to outweigh all the supposed advantages of the plan. For how would a man feel, when he heard of the execution of persons, who only became liable to it through his means, and at his instigation? But the bad consequences of a discovery do not end here. The whole scheme would of course be entirely detected, and whatever progress had been made, and whatever money spent, the work would be to be begun afresh. And then it could not be a work of the same difficulty and danger only; but a work of increased dangers, and increased difficulties; increased on account of the fear persons would entertain of entering on a scheme already once detected, and on account of the additional precautions and vigilance, that would be exerted after the discovery of our attempt to detect new ones. The discovery too, in this case, is not a very pleasant circumstance. That a country, which has even a pretence to call itself, and esteem itself a great country, should attempt to pursue a great plan of policy by bribes and underhand means, is not a very dignified nor a very noble line of policy. It is worthy only of a people, who think of nothing but money; whose God is their gold; who think it will clothe them and feed them, and fight for them, and do every thing for them. The discovery of such a plan of action, would, I am afraid, fully justify all the reproaches thrown out against us as a nation of shop-keepers. It might authorize too somewhat of the accusation of Punic Faith, which has been often made. In short, for my own part, I think, the bad consequences of a discovery in this case would be so many and so grievous, that even if there was little chance of such a discovery (and I believe there would, on the other hand, be great chance of it), and even if in its other parts, I thought the scheme as adviseable as I think it is impolitic; even in that case, for fear of this discovery, I would not attempt it at all. In opposition to all these objections, I know not what advantages can be urged. I believe though, that the reasons for which it has been adopted are, 1st, a notion of its cheapness, and, 2dly, an idea that it will then not be necessary to make any public declaration, and that, therefore, the country will not be pledged to any thing specific, but left at liberty to shift for herself, as opportunities may occur. With respect to the cheapness of this plan, I doubt its having that quality. If you mean to bribe, I suppose you would bribe some general of great authority and influence in the first instance. Such a person would, I doubt, not expect a very handsome and liberal *donum*. The next thing to be done would be to enable him to debauch a part of the army (the more of course the better), which would also be a work of no little expense. And lastly, I presume, you would wish to enable him to commence an open revolt, and wage war with the First Consul. In this case you would have to pay the revolted army, and to support all the expense of a civil war. For observe, by the very essence of your plan you are precluded from doing any thing upon principle; you must, therefore, do it all by money. I should wish some advocate for this scheme would detail the probable expenses of it; rating the first *donum* to the general, the buying of the army, and the expense of the civil war, each as low as he reasonably can; and putting too the duration of that civil war at as short a period as he can expect; and then, I wish, he would fairly compare the probable expenses of his scheme with mine (as detailed last week), and I have no fear of the result. But besides all this, we must take possible disadvantageous circumstances into consideration; for, hitherto, we have supposed the whole to go on as prosperously as possible. Suppose the general were to require a second *donum*, or threaten to betray us; or suppose, that after the second *donum* he actually were to betray us; and, without giving us any intimation of his treachery, were to continue to receive our money, and hand it over into

the French Treasury; or, suppose, that the civil war were to be protracted to a great length. In any of these cases who will venture even to calculate the expense. In short, this plan is, I think, fundamentally bad. Its object is to do that by money, which should be done, and can be done effectually, by nothing but principle; and in its progress, it is as bad as in its principle. It attempts to establish a just and virtuous claim by underhand means; and the agents it employs for this purpose are bought traitors. The second argument in favour of this plan, viz. that thereby the country is pledged to nothing specific; is, I think, more specious, but equally fallacious.——In point of fact, if a general is bought, and when so bought acts fairly by us; we are as much pledged to him as we can be to any body by an open declaration. I much fear, however, that the feeling which dictates this argument is very general. I fear it because it is very base. No one objects to the re-establishment of Lewis XVIII.—I believe there are few who would not be glad of it; but people are afraid that to accomplish it would give them a great deal of trouble, and would take up a great deal of time. They are, therefore, well enough inclined to begin the work, but wish to do it in such a way as to be able to skulk out and avoid the trouble, if they find a favourable opportunity. This is just the way never to accomplish any thing at all. Not that I ever did or ever can recommend the making the restoration of Lewis XVIII. to the throne of France the *sine quâ non* of peace with France. I should think the professing such a thing, would be braving the dispensations of Providence, and amount to absolute impiety. But this I will say; I said it before the treaty of Amiens; I repeat it now, that I would make a well-grounded expectation of security, the *sine quâ non* of peace; and in my conscience, I believe, that that expectation can never be obtained till the revolution of France is entirely put an end to, and the power of France is curtailed. Of this I am sure, that nothing can produce that expectation so entirely and so completely as the accomplishment of these objects; and, therefore, I have no hesitation in recommending the pursuit of them openly, unreservedly, and in the manner most likely to render that pursuit effectual.——Now, there is, I should hope, no one at this time of day, who will attempt to maintain the opinion, that we have no right to interfere in the internal government of France. We have, according to all the most approved writers on the Law of Nations, a right to interfere in behalf of lawful claims against usurpation and rebellion; and this right is as fresh, as entire, and as good now as it was the day after Lewis XVI. was beheaded. I have no book by me at present, but if you wish to refer to books you can easily do it; and in the last edition of Mr. Burke's Works you will find extracts from different authors to that point. But our right is now of a much stronger kind——for the usurping and rebellious power bears towards us the most bitter hatred and animosity; it has the will, and gigantic means to injure and destroy us. Is it then to be stated, that we have no right to prevent it from carrying that avowed hatred into execution? If every authority was on the other side instead of being with us, I should still say we had. Among individuals a man has a right to slay his adversary, if such slaughter is necessary to preserve his own life. In nations, the principle goes one step farther, and it is morally impossible for a country to do any thing, which can conduce to its own destruction. But we are told by ministers themselves, that it is impossible to be at peace with the revolutionary government of France. Eternal war is a most prodigious evil; peace, with the revolutionary government of France, is destruction; what then remains, but to destroy that revolutionary government? The Law of Nations authorizes us to do so, even if it were not dangerous; the Law of Nature commands us to do so, because it is dangerous; who then, or what law then, shall prevent it?——So much for this plan of defence, which may be called the moral mode of defending the country at the present emergency, as in opposition to the physical mode by strength of troops and artillery. I do not mean to set it up in opposition to the other; but to urge it as a very efficacious and salutary plan, which may go along with it. They will both work at the same time, and both tend to the same object, the permanent security of the country and of peace.—With respect to the physical defence of the country, since my last the House of Commons have received and passed a bill for further arming and training the people. I have been prevented by various occupations from taking advantage of ———'s kindness, and getting a seat in the gallery during the debates on this bill. The outline, however, as far as I understand it, I will endeavour to describe. All the males in the kingdom between the ages of 17 and 60 are to be enrolled. These are to be divided into four classes, according to their respective ages

and situations, with respect to wives and families. The first class is to be immediately trained to arms on stated days of the week, and the other classes are to be liable to be called upon, as the preceding ones are called away to service. This, I believe, is the general plan, though not having read it, I am not very positive as to the fact. I do not know any of the details, nor do I wish to discuss them. The fundamental principle is good; which is, to train all the men in the kingdom to arms, and to make this a military people. This, I believe, is now necessary for our salvation. The thing is good in itself, and it is good in its consequences. I rejoice that we are likely to become a military people; as such, I rejoice too, that we are likely to cease to be a commercial people, a purely commercial people, a nation dealing in ribbons and hardwares, actuated by no principle, but that of advantage, and seeking no object, but that of lucre. I assume, that we are likely to cease to be such, because war and commerce are incompatible with each other. A warlike people cannot be a commercial people, nor a commercial people a warlike one. A retailer of ribbons, a measurer of muslins and gauzes cannot wield a sword or handle a musket. The things are in their nature inconsistent, and cannot go together. A warlike people must have a high sense of honour—a commercial people must be meek and submissive. A warlike people must be proud—a commercial people must be base. A warlike people must ever resent every insult on their honour, and every attack on their dignity—a commercial people must not see the insults, nor feel the blows. I rejoice at the change, because by commerce the mind of the country is debased, and its spirit lowered; by commerce we are now brought to the very edge of the precipice, one step farther we submit to the yoke of France, and to the most ignominious as well as cruel slavery; but by war, and the renewal of a martial spirit, we may yet escape, we may yet get the better of the present dangers, and rise, in a short time, to a state of grandeur and power, yet unparalleled in the history of Britain. By a vigorous martial spirit alone can we now save ourselves from destruction, save Europe from chains, and the world from the yoke of the most horrible despotism and tyranny that ever appeared upon earth. By this spirit, our character retrieved, France restored to peace, to good order, to the worship of God; the liberties of Europe restored, and assumed, we may yet see the day when this country will flourish, not in luxury as of late years, not in effeminacy and debauchery, but in power magnificent, in honour conspicuous, in liberty most happy; admired by all, respected and feared, yet not beheld with jealousy or hatred, because using all its power and all its means for the good of others, for the support of justice and of liberty. All Europe will own its safety due to the exertions, and its happiness to the valour and generosity of Britain.——Such is the prospect which the present disastrous times would open to the view of an intelligent, lofty-minded, generous, and enlightened statesman. Can this be so now? Never; so long as the grovelling, sordid stupidity of little minds, and low birth are palsying, not directing the energies of the state. To accomplish this great plan, we must have statesmen of great abilities, of generous minds, and high birth. The dunghill cock cannot fight, nor can the dray-horse start for a plate. ——I have been led a little rambling into these reflections by the very last measures of ministers; this plan which I am commending—I praise the bill, not the time at which they have brought it forward. How slow and dilatory they are! If the danger exists now, it existed many weeks and months ago. Why was it not brought forward as soon as possible? Why was it not proposed to the House the 9th of March? That would have been the way to settle the pretended differences between the two governments mentioned in the message of the 8th. Then ministers might have claimed a little praise for activity and vigour. But no; the militia must be first called out, and then the supplementary militia, and then the Army of Reserve Bill was to be passed. I do not know why all this was to be done before every male could be enrolled. Would the men have been less fit for the militia, or the supplementary, or the army of reserve, or for the line, if they chose to enlist, for being enrolled? Or would the young men of the first class have been less fit for these corps for being already drilled and accustomed to the firelock? Or would they have been less likely to enlist on that account? In all this I can see no good reason; but I can give you a very good one—a good one for the ministers. If this measure had been brought forward as soon as it ought, it would have been much better for the country; but that with his Majesty's present wise advisers is an after-thought, it would have been much worse *for them*, inasmuch as they would probably have lost their places. They have, I believe, no objection to save

the country if they conveniently can; but the preservation of their places is the first object, the saving of the country the second; if they can do both they are not sorry; but the two objects stand, as to precedence, as I have stated. With respect to this measure, if it had been adopted the 9th of March, the country would have been in much greater security than it is at present; but what would have been said to the ministers? Why, then, every fool would have had sense enough to say, "what is "this immense danger grown up immedi-"ately on your peace? We were in no "such danger before the peace pro-"duced it; you made the peace, *therefore* "you have brought us into this dilemma, "and must suffer for it." The minister knew that this would be said, and he knew what would be the consequence; and accordingly, with all the cunning imaginable, puts off this most pressing work, till by other preparatory measures he has so occupied the minds of men with the danger, and the means of resisting it, that they hardly have time to stop to think of his folly or wickedness. They are so taken up with the means of defence, the danger appears so great and so near, that they never enquire, who brought it on? Foolishly, I think, do they not enquire. For if it should perchance turn out, on examination, that those persons on whom they are now relying for safety, and in whom they are reposing more confidence than was almost ever before reposed in any ministers, are the very individual persons by whose mismanagement, or, if they like it, under whose management, this country has been reduced from the state in which it was in February 1801, to that in which it is at this moment. I think they would not wish to trust the means of extricating them from their present difficulties, to these persons. This, then, I think, they ought well to weigh, well to consider, and immediately to act in consequence. By cunning this wise and natural mode of proceeding has hitherto been delayed. I wish it may not be put off till it is too late. Sooner or later justice must come, and those will be called upon who have abilities, courage, and honesty to do their duty. I only wish that we may not be too dilatory.——I am, &c.

INQUISITOR.

Postscript, July 25, 1803.

Though my letter is already grown to so unwieldy a size, I yet cannot refrain from noticing the publication that has appeared in all the Morning Papers of this day; and which has, it is said, been spread about by Monsieur, the brother of the King of France. You will observe, all the additional weight and force which the arguments of my two last letters acquire from that publication. You will observe, that by the proposal made to the King of France by Buonaparté, he has himself acknowledged in the most explicit terms, the justice and force of the claims, which I wish to be set up. You will observe too, that the fact of his having made this proposal, is an acknowledgment of the countenance, which such claims, if properly set up, would meet with in France.—What possible inducement could he have to make so foolish and ridiculous a proposal, but a hope of being able thereby to stifle those claims, and consequently, to rid himself of all the danger that could accrue to him on their assertion? He might have other inducements mixed with this one.—To offer an insult to an unfortunate Prince, must always be a gratification to such a mind as that of the First Consul. To make a legitimate Sovereign, such as the King of Prussia, disgrace himself and his regal title by being the bearer of such a message from such a sender, to such a receiver, must doubtless be a great gratification to the mind of a jacobin, a rebel, and an usurper. But these motives alone would not be sufficient to induce the First Consul to expose himself to the mortification of a refusal. He must have had some faint hope, that his offer might be accepted. A ridiculous expectation, no doubt, probably founded on his wishes. But we continually see this, that when a man desires a thing ardently, he soon brings himself actually to expect it. This, probably, was the case in this instance; Buonaparté knows how good the claim of Lewis XVIII. is; he knows that that claim asserted manfully and vigorously, would soon overthrow his power; and he wished to deprive his enemies of so powerful and effectual a weapon against him; but, fortunately for France and the civilised world, he has failed. He has failed; and has failed in such a manner, that he has now put it into the power of the King of France to call upon his people by a new argument, to uphold his rights, and assert his claims. Allegiance, fidelity, love, and respect, all these urged them before to do so. Now gratitude comes in aid of these; for their sakes has he refused power, ease, and comfort; for their sakes is he willing to brave all the miseries of poverty and distress; and to submit to the scoffs and insults of those, whom his cruel persecutors may compel to violate the laws of hospitality and charity in his instance? Out of love for those will he submit to all this? and will they not feel themselves bound in gratitude to make some little return for these sacrifices? Will they bear to see their lawful King insulted by the very man who oppresses them? No: the people of France would rejoice to shed their blood in his cause; they would rejoice to overthrow the present tyranny, and to see again amongt them, their lawful King. But alone and unassisted they cannot do this. Kept down by an army of 500,000 men, they cannot stir. They must have succour from without; they must have some foreign aid, some *point d'appui*, or they can never advance one step. England, by every rule of policy, and every call of justice, ought to step forward for this purpose. The work is glorious, it is easy, and it is short; it is a decision of England's glory and greatness, and of the peace of the world. If this step is not taken the governors of England are responsible, they are responsible to their King and Country for the dangers, which, by their not doing so, will be entailed on them. But

they are responsible not to them only, they are responsible to the whole civilised world, for the impending calamities not averted; to all the Christian world for the cause of their religion not asserted; they are responsible to the present age, to posterity, and to God.——I shall not detain you any longer now to reason, on the proof contained in the Letter of the King of France, of the numerous faithful adherents that still remain to him. "I could yet appeal," says he, "to my "faithful subjects, and I know I shall never be in "want." Nor will I say any thing about the magnanimity and loftiness of sentiment; the real kingly feeling that pervades these letters. He who reads them cannot fail to see and notice it; and he who does not at once feel this, by no argument will ever be made to understand or conceive it.—That all may feel and perceive it, and act in consequence as good and faithful subjects of a King, and prosecute this noble cause to a successful issue, is the hearty wish and prayer of your sincere friend. I.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

Notification respecting the Blockade of the WESER, *dated London, July* 26, 1803.

The King has been pleased to cause it to be signified by the Right Honourable Lord Hawkesbury, his Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to the Ministers of Neutral Powers residing at this Court, that the necessary measures having been taken by his Majesty's command for the blockade of the entrance of the River Weser, in consequence of his Majesty having recently received authentic information of the occupation of parts of the banks of that river by the French troops, the said river is declared to be in a state of blockade; and that from this time, all the measures authorised by the Law of Nations, and the respective Treaties between his Majesty and the different Neutral Powers, will be adopted and executed with respect to all vessels which may attempt to violate the said blockade. Lord Hawkesbury has been further commanded by his Majesty to signify to the Ministers of the Neutral Powers, that whenever the French troops will evacuate the positions which they now occupy on the parts of the banks of the Weser, and will remove to such a distance from them as to leave the course of that river perfectly free and secure to the vessels of his Subjects, as well as of other Nations, his Majesty will immediately direct his ships of war, which may be stationed at the mouth of the River Weser, for the purpose of blockading the same, to be withdrawn.

DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Downing-street, July 30, 1803.——*A Dispatch, of which the following is a copy, has been this day received from Lieut.-Gen. Grinfield, Commander in Chief of his Majesty's troops in the Windward and Leeward Charibbee Islands, by the Right Hon. Lord Hobart, his Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the War Department. Dated, St. Lucia, June* 22, 1803.

MY LORD,——It is with satisfaction I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that this day the fortress of Morne Fortunée was carried by assault, and the Island of St. Lucia is in consequence unconditionally restored to the British Govt.——I have to state to your Lordship, that in consequence of His Majesty's order, signified to me in your Letter, dated the 16th of May, and received on the 14th instant, which I immediately communicated to Commodore Hood, he arrived at Barbadoes on the 17th; the troops, stores, &c. were on board, or embarked on the 19th; sailed on the 20th. On the 21st, at day-break, they were off the north end of St. Lucia; in the course of the day the greatest part of the troops were disembarked in Choque-Bay; about half past five the out-posts of the enemy were driven in, the town of Castries taken, and a summons was sent to the Commander of the troops of the French Republic.—In consequence of the refusal of Brigade-General Nogues to accede to any terms, and the expectation of approaching rains, it became necessary to get possession of the Morne with as little delay as possible. It was therefore determined, this morning, to attack the fortress by assault, which was done accordingly at four o'clock, and it was carried in about half an hour, and with less loss, considering the resistance, than could have been expected; but the loss has been chiefly among the higher ranks of officers, and those the most truly valuable; but it is yet to be hoped most of them will recover, for the real benefit of his Majesty's service.—I cannot omit a circumstance which reflects so much credit, as well on the British nation, as on the conduct of the soldiers actually employed, that, notwithstanding the severe and spirited resistance of the French troops, yet, no sooner were the works carried by assault, and the opposition no longer existed, than every idea of animosity appeared to cease, and not a French soldier was either killed or wounded.——The return of the killed and wounded is herewith inclosed, which, excepting the number of officers of high rank, is not equal to what might have been expected, and, by far less than it would have been, in all probability, had a formal investment of the fortress taken place.——These dispatches will be delivered to your Lordship by my Aid-du-Camp, Captain Weir, to whom I beg to refer your Lordship, for any information you may require.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the troops in the assault and capture of the Fortress of Morne Fortunée, in the Island of St. Lucia, in the morning of the 22d June, 1803.

Royal Military Artificers.—1 Serjeant, killed.—2d Battalion Royals.—1 Serjeant, 8 Rank and File, killed; 1 Field Offi. 1 Capt. 2 Serjs. 43 Rank and F. wounded; 1 R. and F. missing.—64th Reg.—1 Serj. 5 R. and F. killed; 2 Field Offi. 1 Capt. 1 Sub. 2 Serj. 31 R. and F. wounded; 1 R. and F. missing.—68th Ditto.—1 Drum. missing.——3d West India Reg.——1 Serj. 3 R. and F. killed; 2 Sub. 23 R. and F. wounded; 5 R. and F. missing.——Staff. 1 Field Offi. wounded. —— Total—4 Serj. 16 R. and F. killed; 4 Field-Offi. 2 Capt. 3 Sub. 4 Serj. 97 R. and F. wounded; 1 Drum. 7 R. and F. missing—Officers wounded.——2d Bat. Royals.—Lieut. Col. Macdonald, severely; Capt. Chaloner, severely.—64th Reg.—Lieut. Col. Pakenham, severely; Maj. Sir George Richardson, Cap. Galway, Lieut. Frederick Rowan, slightly.——3d West India Reg.—Lieut. Moultrice, slightly; Ensign Fagan, slightly.——Staff.—Lieut. Col. Morden, Deputy Adj. Gen. severely.——N. B. Hospital Mate Heynes, attached to 3d West India Reg. severely wounded, not included above.

(Signed) W. TATUM, Captain Assistant Adjutant General.

Admiralty-Office, July 30, 1803.—*Copy of a Letter from Commodore Hood, Commander in Chief of his Majesty's*

Ships and Vessels at the Leeward Islands, to Sir Evan Nepean, Baronet, dated on board the Centaur, in Choc-Bay, St. Lucia, 22d June, 1803.

SIR,——I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that, on my arrival at Barbadoes on the 17th, late in the evening, having consulted Lieutenant-General Grinfield with respect to the intended co-operations of the army and navy, I instantly took measures to prevent further supplies being thrown into St. Lucia, (the ships on this service, under the orders of Captain O'Bryen, of the Emerald, made some captures of trading vessels), and every disposition was settled for embarking the troops and light artillery on board the ships of war, and the necessary stores, &c. in small vessels for the expedition; by great exertions the whole was effected on the 20th, and the arrangements completed. The Lieutenant-General having embarked with the troops, I put to sea with the ships named in the margin *; was joined next morning by the Emerald and Osprey, having Brigadier-General Prevost on board, and were all anchored by eleven o'clock in this Bay.——There being a strong breeze, the boats of the squadron had a heavy pull with the first division of the army, composed of the 2d battalion of the Royals, and two field-pieces, under the command of Brigadier General Brereton; but, by the great energy and excellent disposition made by Captain Hallowell, were landed in good order about two P. M. and by the perseverance of every officer and man employed in landing the remainder of the troops, the Lieutenant-General was enabled to make an early arrangement for an attack on that very important and strong post, Morne Fortunée, where the force of the enemy was assembled, which, on the Commandant refusing to give up when summoned, was ordered to be attacked with that decision and promptitude which has always been the characteristic mark of Lieut. Gen. Grinfield, and carried by storm at half past four this morning, with the superior bravery which has ever distinguished the British soldier: this placed the Colony completely in our possession.——To Captain Hallowell's merit it is impossible for me to give additional encomium, as it is so generally known; but I must beg leave to say, on this expedition, his activity could not be exceeded; and by his friendly advice I have obtained the most effectual aid to this service, for which he has been a volunteer; and, after the final disembarkation, proceeded on with the seamen to co-operate with the army. The marines of the squadron, by desire of the Lieutenant-General, were landed and ordered to take post near Gros Ilet, to prevent supplies being thrown into Pigeon Island, which, on the fall of Morne Fortunée, was delivered up. — We are already occupied in re-embarking troops and other necessary service for future operations.——Capt. Littlehales (of this ship) is charged with the dispatch, whose assiduity and attention I with much satisfaction acknowledge, will be able to give their Lord-ships any further information.—— I have the honour to be, &c. SAM HOOD.

Dublin, Tuesday, July 26.——A Proclamation, by the Lord Lieutenant and Council of Ireland.

Whereas it has become necessary to use the most speedy and effectual means to put an end to the rebellious insurrections which have broken out, and have been attended with the most daring and flagrant outrages:—We the Lord Lieutenant have thought fit, by and with the advice of his Majesty's Privy Council, to give orders, and we have accordingly given the most positive orders to the officers commanding his Majesty's forces, to exert the utmost energy for that purpose, and accordingly to attack and disperse all assemblies of armed rebels, wherever they may be found, and to do military execution upon all such rebels as they shall find in arms ——Given at the Council Chamber in Dublin, the 25th July, 1803.

(Signed) HARDWICKE.

* Centaur, Courageux, Argo, Chichester, Hornet, and Cyane.

INTELLIGENCE.

FOREIGN.—The Government of Lucca has, in obedience to the commands of France, prohibited the importation of any articles of British merchandize into the ports of the Republic, and excluded the English from its territories, during the continuance of the present war.——The Convention, recently concluded between the French and Batavian Republics, has been ratified by the latter. By this Convention the Batavian Republic has agreed to take 18,000 French troops into pay during the war, and to furnish, as auxiliary of France, 16,000 of her own.——M. Schimmelpenninck, lately Ambassador from Holland to the Court of London, set out for Brussels on the 21st ult. on a mission to the First Consul.——The Dutch Government has given orders for fitting out, with all possible dispatch, 100 gun-boats and 250 flat-bottomed boats, intended to serve in the invasion of England.——The French Commander in the Island of Walcheren has published an order for all the English to leave that Island within four days. They will receive passes for the interior of Holland.——The French Chef d'Escadre, Donadieu, who held a command in the expedition destined for Louisiana, has been arrested at the Hague, upon the charge of being concerned in a plot against the life of the First Consul.——Accounts received from America, state, that the Government of the Island of St. Domingo has made some arrangement with the Chiefs of the Brigands, in consequence of which considerable quantities of produce have been brought into Cape François for exportation.

DOMESTIC.——The British Government has issued an order for the blockade of the River Weser, and has declared, that as soon as the French troops on that river will evacuate their positions, the ships blockading it shall be withdrawn.*——The rebellion in Ireland appears to have almost entirely

* See page 171.

subsided. Many of the conspirators in different parts of the country have been arrested and their papers taken. Great quantities of arms, ammunition, clothing, &c. &c. intended for the rebel armies have been discovered and seized. Some counties, which were reported to be on the eve of insurrection, remain quiet; and, from the vigilance and activity which the government has displayed since the commencement of the disturbances, there is every reason to believe that for the present, the rebellion will be suppressed.— A meeting of the Freeholders of Middlesex was convened at Hackney, on the 2d inst. for the purpose of addressing the King. An address was brought forward * and approved, and was directed to be presented by the Sheriffs and Mr. Byng, one of the members for the County. Sir Francis Burdett was present, but the sentiments he avowed were so offensive to the meeting, that, although one of their representatives in Parliament, he was not appointed to attend the Sheriffs with the address.——On the 2d of August a motion was brought forward in the House of Commons by Col. Craufurd, recommending the immediate execution of a plan for the fortification of the metropolis.† After a very long discussion the motion was withdrawn. On the same day, Mr. Fox moved that an address should be presented to his Majesty, praying him to appoint a Military Council.‡ After some debate the House divided, and the motion was negatived 38 to 63. The following gentlemen voted in the minority.

Adair, Robert—Barclay, George—Barham, Joseph Foster—Calcraft, John—Chapman, Charles—Combe, Harvey—Dent, John—Dillon, Hon. Aug. —Elford, Sir Wm —Elliott, William—Erskine, Sir Wm. Bart.—Folkstone, Viscount—Fonblanque, John—Fortescue, Wm. Charles—Fox, Hon. Chas. —Francis, Phillip—Gower, Lord G. L.—Giles, Daniel—Hughes, Wm Lewis—Hurst, Robert—Hutchinson, Hon. C.—Johnstone, George—Kensington, Lord—Laurence, French—Macmahon, John — Morpeth, Viscount — North, Dudley—Phipps, Hon. Edmund—Pulteney, Sir Wm. Bart. —St. John, Hon. Sr. A.—Shum, George—Smith, Wm. (Norwich)—Spencer, Lord Robert—Tyrrwhitt, Thomas—Ward, Hon. J. W.—Williams, Sir R. Bart.—Windham, Right Hon. W.—Wood, Mark.——Tellers—J. Cranfurd—R. B. Sheridan.

On the 3d, the Secretary at War brought in a bill to enable his Majesty to suspend the execution of the General Arming Bill, at his discretion.

MILITARY.——The greatest part of the Hanoverian army is already disbanded and disarmed, and those who composed it are returning home in different directions. The French troops which had posted themselves on the Elbe for the purpose of disarming the Hanoverians are also returning. A part of these troops is immediately to be sent into Holland, and others are already marching towards Hanover to replace them. Fifteen thousand men are to occupy the district of Lauenburgh, and the magazines which were recently established there for the Hanoverian army will be appropriated to their use. Three millions of francs have been exacted of the Hanoverians, for the support of Gen. Mortier's army; and the inhabitants of Luneburg have been required to furnish, without delay, 30,000 shirts, 15,000 pair of shoes, and various other articles of clothing. A camp of French and Batavian troops is forming on Gressel-heath near Dewenter, and, is to be furnished with a very strong train of artillery. French troops are now spread over the greatest part of Italy, and additional corps continue daily to arrive. Gen. Verdier, with a body of 10,000 men has marched along the coast of the Adriatic, as far as Tarentum, where the head-quarters are established.—It is said that the First Consul will assume the title of Commander in Chief of the Army of England, which is to consist of 200,000 men. The head-quarters are to be established *pro tempore* at Compeigne. This army is to form a cordon from the mouth of the Elbe to Rochelle and Rochfort, and is to be subdivided into four separate armies; the first of which is to extend from the Mouth of the Elbe to Flushing, and to comprehend the troops dispersed in the Electorate of Hanover and the Batavian Republic; the second is to be formed by the troops in Belgium, and to extend from Flushing to Dunkirk: the third is to extend from Dunkirk to Cherbourg, and to comprise the troops cantoned in the departments of the North, the Pas-de-Calais, la Somme, and Basse Loire, and the fourth is to extend from Cherbourg to Brest and Rochfort, and to comprehend all the troops distributed in the departments of the West. —In conformity to the orders issued by his Majesty's government for the commencement of hostilities in the West-Indies, Lieut. Gen. Grinfield, in conjunction with Commodore Hood made preparations in June last, for an attack upon St. Lucia. The British forces arrived off the North end of the Island on the morning of the 21st and disembarked in Choque Bay. In the afternoon the outposts of the enemy were driven in, the town of Castres taken, and the commander of the troops of the French Republic summoned to surrender. In consequence of

* See p. 178. † See p. 187. ‡ See p. 191.

the refusal of Brigade Gen. Nogués to accede to any terms. the fortress of Morne Fortunée was attacked early the next day and carried by assault, after an obstinate resistance. The possession of this important post placed the whole island under the dominion of the British *.

NAVAL.——The Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports has presented to the Admiralty an offer from the whole body of pilots and mariners of Deal, to give their personal service to the Country in any manner which may be desired, and to equip fifty gun-boats. —Dispatches were received on Sunday last, from Admiral Cornwallis, informing government that six sail of French line of battle ships had moved from Brest Harbour into the outer road; and that several frigates and gun-boats were assembling at the same place.—On the 25th June, the French corvette L'Enfant Prodigue of 16 guns, was captured by the Emerald, one of the ships under the command of Commodore Hood. ——On the 13th ult. Capt. Griffiths, in the Constance, captured the French privateer Le Furch, two days from Boulogne. On the 16th Capt. Parker in the Amazon, captured the French privateer Le Felix, of 16 guns and 96 men, 24 days from Rochelle.——On the 26th Capt. Bedford, in the Thunderer, captured the French privateer Venus, of 18 guns and 150 men, 5 days from Bourdeaux.—His Majesty's frigate Le Seine, of 42 guns lately got on a sand bank near Schelling, and the crew being unable to get her off set fire to her and left her.—Lord Nelson is stated to have circulated a Manifesto, declaring his determination to capture all vessels coming from the Ports of France, or those Italian Ports which are occupied by French troops.——Accounts have been recently received of the safe arrival at Ferrol, of four French ships of the line from St. Domingo. The British squadron stationed off the Spanish coast was gone in pursuit of the Dutch Admiral Hartsink.——On the 18th July, 300 English merchant ships sailed from Elsineur for the North Sea under convoy.—The whole of the Russian fleet at Cronstadt, consisting of about twenty ships of war, will be immediately fitted for sea.

Statement of the Distribution of the British Naval Force, on the First of August, 1803.

In port and fitting, and with sealed orders 88 ships of the line, fifties, frigates, and sloops; in the English and Irish Channels 73; on the Downs and North Sea Stations 67; in the West-Indies 47; on the American Station 11; at the Cape of Good Hope and in the East-Indies 25; on the Coast of Africa 2; at Portugal and Gibraltar, and in the Mediterranean 46; Hospital and Prison Ships 9; amounting altogether to 373. There are besides, 14 Receiving Ships, 27 repairing, 180 in ordinary, and 42 building, making in all 636 in commission.—The ordinary at Portsmouth is 57, at Plymouth 59, at Chatham 56, at Sheerness 14, and in the River 35: in all 221.

Address of the Freeholders and Inhabitants of the County of Middlesex:

TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

We, your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, freeholders and inhabitants of the County of Middlesex, impressed with the ardent love of our Country, and the blessings we enjoy under the British Constitution, the palladium of our personal security, liberty, and property, induced by that merited esteem due to a gracious Sovereign and his Royal Family, approach your sacred Person, to express our warm indignation against the disturbers of the peace, comforts, and consolations of mankind, to proclaim our just abhorrence of the treacherous designs of deluded and domestic foes, and to declare our patriotic disdain of the threats and vauntings of our foreign enemies. Actuated by such loyal and constitutional sentiments, we solemnly pledge our united assistance by the offer of our personal service and property, to defend and preserve inviolate your Majesty's person and government, our laws, liberties, and religion, and our long established constitution, purchased for us by the blood of our ancestors, the pride of Britons, and the envy of the world.—Permit us, Most Gracious Sovereign, to assure your Majesty, that no hostile threats can intimidate a people animated by the love of liberty, and inspired with a sense of duty and affection; who, confiding in the Divine Providence, the wisdom of your Councils, and the valour of your subjects, are resolved to employ their utmost efforts to repel the insults, and defeat the attempts of our inveterate and destructive enemies.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

THE CAPTURE OF ST. LUCIA was, last Saturday, celebrated with those marks of joy, with which, in such cases, the government usually sets an example to the people. But, with the smoke of the Park and Tower guns, evaporated, not the public *joy*, for none was either expressed or felt, but the small portion of *curiosity*, excited by the discharge of those guns. The first fire did, we are informed, excite a momentary hope of *peace*, in the minds of the stock-dealers; but, when the people came to learn the real cause of the firing, they seemed to hang their heads with shame. This capture is the first blow of that "*five years of successful war*," which, as Mr. Windham truly stated, it will require to place us, with re-

spect to France, where we were previous to the peace of Amiens.——Nothing is said: the people are perfectly indifferent to these things: fear has so completely possessed them, that their minds have no room for indignation against those who have brought them to the verge of destruction: they hear of an expedition, where British ships and British regiments are engaged; where a battle is fought; where an island is captured; where a considerable number of French are made prisoners; where many Englishmen are killed and wounded: they hear of all this, and take no more notice of it, than of the whistling of the wind: they do not inquire what harm this conquest will do the enemy, or what good it will do us; they do not ask the minister how he can answer to that tender conscience of his for having already expended a hundred thousand pounds, and sacrificed many lives in the recapture of about one hundredth part of that strength and wealth, which he yielded to our enemy apparently for no other purpose than that of retaining his ill-gotten emoluments and power. No; they do not ask him this; nor do they ask him what will become of the Island of St. Lucia at the next peace; whether it be given as a ransom for some part of England or Ireland, or whether it be, amongst other colonies, again to be given back to France, in order that, by such restoration, we may, according to the opinion of the wise Lord Castlereagh, *thereby* "regain our *influence in the* "*Continent of Europe!*" About these things the people make no inquiry: they are alarmed for their money and their lives; and, if the minister will but insure these, he may do what he pleases with their liberties, and with the dominions of their sovereign. We fear, alas! that Mr. Addington's insurance will be like that of LORD PETER, and that "the poor caitiffs who "trust to it will lose their lives and their "money too."

ST. DOMINGO, which, according to the statements of the London newspapers, was, *long since evacuated*, for the *last time*, is, it appears, now in a better state than ever, "promises again to become a flourishing "colony," and this information comes, too, through the channel of these very newspapers. Agreeably to the maxims, on which the ministers grounded their justification for having permitted the French expedition to sail for the West-Indies, they never can adopt any measure for severing this island from France. They clearly stated, that it was better for an hostile French army to exist constantly in St. Domingo, than that St. Domingo should remain under the "black usurpation;" whence it follows, that we must take the island ourselves, or leave it quietly in the hands of an hostile French army, because, if we annoy and finally defeat that army, without defeating the blacks at the same time, we restore the terrific black usurpation. As to taking the island ourselves, as to subduing the blacks and the French both at once, that, we should suppose, would be hardly attempted, till, at least, time has worn away the recollection of Colonel Maitland's economical and heroic campaigns. The French army must, then, be left in the island, the ports of which cannot be completely blockaded, and, if they could be and were to be so blockaded, the black usurpation would thereby be revived. The conclusion therefore is, that, according to the maxims of the ministers, St. Domingo must remain a most formidable military rendezvous, and Jamaica must remain in a state of constant danger, a just punishment, indeed, for those planters of that island, who rejoiced at the peace, but a very serious evil to this country.

THE BLOCKADE OF THE WESER has, very properly, followed that of the Elbe. This measure has created great distress in the north of Germany, particularly in the states of the King of Prussia, and, for this very reason, if for no other, we highly approve of it. Every place, be it in whose dominions soever it may, which submits to the arms or to the decrees of France, we ought to proceed against as our enemy.

NEGOTIATION WITH RUSSIA.—The object of this negotiation is, on the part of Russia, certainly not amicable towards Great-Britain, however it may so appear. The Cabinet of St. Petersburgh has views on a part of India, and their project of expelling the Turks from Europe will never be abandoned. These objects, it is thought, cannot be accomplished without the co operation of France, and that co-operation cannot be obtained, so long as we have the possession of Malta. It is therefore determined, at St. Petersburgh, to use every means to induce us to evacuate that island. At present the Emperor, who is a very gentle and humane man, is governed entirely by the Empress, who has a friend, a Prince CZARTORISKY, a Pole, devoted to France; while the prime minister, Count Alexander Woronzow, is, we understand, the avowed enemy of this country: so that, notwithstanding the sanguine expectations of Mr. Fox, we shall have every thing to fear and nothing to hope from the disposition of

Russia, if Malta once falls into her hands. As to guarantees, that they are as farcical as any of the exhibitions of Mr. Sheridan, whether on the town or *provincial* stage, wants no other proof than that which has been afforded by the result of the treaty of Luneville. And should, hereafter, a change take place in the politics of the Court of St. Petersburgh, we shall, by giving up Malta, have put it out of the power of a ministry friendly to us to adopt any line of policy favourable to our interests. As long as we retain Malta, Russia will not quarrel with us; but, we, for our parts, shall not be at all surprised to find, that the surrender of Malta, under some shuffling pretext or other, is the main point, on which the present negotiation with Russia turns. The ministers are at work: Lord Hawkesbury has got his pen in hand; and we all know with what fatal secrecy, with what deadly haste, he proceeds in bartering away the interests and honour of our country.

THE LONDON PRESS, which has always been conspicuous for baseness, is, at this moment, exhibiting that quality in a degree far surpassing any thing of the kind ever before witnessed. Our readers must well remember the manner in which the London newspapers, the *Morning Post* particularly, spoke of Sir Francis Burdett and the Middlesex election; they must well remember the libels which this paper poured forth against MR. ARIS, MR. MAINWARING, and, indeed, against all the magistrates of the county; they must remember, that it was to this paper, principally, that Sir Francis owed his success; it justified all his proceedings, approved of all his sentiments, echoed his outrageous language, circulated his daring doctrines, joined him most heartily in his defiance of "*bired* Sheriffs, Par-"liaments, and *Kings!*" Yet, this paper is now railing against Sir Francis Burdett for acting upon the very same principles, on which it before supported him; railing against him in good set terms, and, not only railing against him for what he has said, but shamefully misrepresenting him, and, moreover, imputing to him sentiments which he has, both in and out of Parliament, positively disowned. We are, however, by no means sorry, that Sir Francis Burdett has experienced this sort of treatment: it will be a lesson for him and for other rich men, who are foolish or wicked enough to think of becoming demagogues. The man of the Morning Post is more sagacious than Sir Francis, and, indeed, is made of more pliant materials. A dread of the French has, amongst the people, got the better of every other feeling: *liberty* and *philanthropy* are out of fashion; they will not, now-a-days, sell for so much as "*loyalty*," and a *hatred of the French*, and, therefore it is, that the man of the Morning Post does not bring the former to market, while poor Sir Francis is weak enough to continue his old traffic. Besides, the man of the Morning Post, and others of his description, have a peculiar and powerful stimulus to "*loyalty*" in the dread of *Cayenne*, with which Buonaparté has threatened them. They remember the fate of their old friends Collot d'Herbois, and his associates in murder, whom the Morning Post loaded with praises; they remember the dismal accounts given by those who escaped from Cayenne; the ideas of dreary woods and burning sands, fogs and fevers, lizards and vipers, musquitoes and gallinippers, constantly haunt their minds. They have the sense to perceive, that nothing but the duration of the monarchy can prevent them from taking a trip to the other side of the equinox, and, *therefore*, they are *loyal*; but, if they could obtain a positive assurance, that they should remain untouched, their columns would, at this moment, be filled with eulogies on the man, to whom they are now applying every term and epithet descriptive of wickedness. No act of baseness, on the part of such men, can excite much astonishment; but, till one takes time to reflect on their characters and motives, one really does wonder, that they should have the impudence now to represent, as a "*fiend in* "*human shape*," the very man with whom, twelve months ago, they rejoiced that their country had made a treaty of *amity*.—What, too, must the *candid* ministry think of the language that is now made use of against Buonaparté? It would be well worth while to collect together all the things now said, all the pictures now exhibited, and compare them with what was said and represented by the same persons only a year ago. Through the same window, nay, through the very same pane of glass, where we beheld Buonaparté *shaking hands with the King*, we now behold him *hanging upon a gallows!* And, let it be observed, that this change has not been produced by any *new crimes*, on his part. All the atrocities, which are now justly imputed to him, he had committed *before* his hand was put into that of his Majesty; *before* his levee was crowded with crouching nobility and gentry from England; *before* the Duchesses of Gordon and of Dorset curtsied to his wife; *before* the vile news-printers of London abused Lord Grenville for "not treating him with suffi-

"cient respect;" *before* the man of the Morning Post thought it necessary to observe, that "Madame Buonaparté's *virtues* "entitled her to the *envied* caresses and "affections of the *illustrious personage*, who "had chosen her for his spouse!" It was *before* all this was said and done, that Buonaparté had pillaged, massacred, poisoned, and apostatized. Where, then, will the world be able to find any honourable motive for the present conduct of the London press?

FRENCH BISHOPS AND EMIGRATS.—— The observations published, in the True Briton and Morning Post relative to these gentlemen, have drawn forth a reply from the *Mercure de France*, which reply has been inserted in the Moniteur. It is a complete piece of reasoning, and it cannot fail to excite, amongst the nations of Europe, a just abhorrence of the principles of those by whom the London news papers are conducted. We shall insert, in our next, a translation of the article, of which we are here speaking, and, in the mean time, our readers will, we hope, do us the justice to recollect, that *we* reprobated the publications of which the French writers so justly complain, and in which all the London papers, the Morning Chronicle excepted, took a part.

THE DEFENCE BILLS, as they are called, have already been found to be incapable of execution. They appear to have effected no purpose but that of throwing the whole country into confusion. No man knows what to do: there is a stir, and a stir is good; but no other good has been produced. The people are ready to come forward; but, they have neither arms nor leaders; and, we understand, that all the offices connected with military affairs are crowded with applications for an *interpretation of the laws*. Not a man of the Army of Reserve is yet put under the command of any military officer. I saw on Tuesday last, from thirty to forty men for this army, whom the magistrates knew not where to send, or what to do with. There was no officer to receive them, nor was there any person that could tell where such officer was to be looked for, or where any information, relative to the matter, was to be obtained. This is just what was foretold: "the men are run-"ning about bleating for officers." It was, I thought, settled, that they should be sent to *join old regiments*; but this part of the plan has, I fear, been frustrated by the eager desire of increasing patronage! These, assuredly, are not the times for indulging a propensity of this sort.——So great is the confusion of ideas created by the Defence Bills and their numerous regulations, that, in many places, one bill is not distinguished from the other. The very names of the bills are not clearly known. The first is sometimes called the Army of Reserve Bill, sometimes the Additional Army Bill, sometimes the Conscript Bill, sometimes the Pressing Bill; and, as to the last bill, it has never yet obtained any name at all, good, bad, or indifferent. Then, as to the provisions, they are so numerous, so complicated, and, in many cases, so contradictory to each other, that it is absolutely impossible to execute them. There is no want of willingness on the part of the people, no want of attention and zeal in the gentry, clergy, or magistrates; all the nerves and limbs are ready to perform their functions; but there wants the head, the directing mind; these should be possessed by the ministry, who, unfortunately possess no such thing. The Secretary at War, some time ago, passed a very severe censure upon the magistrates of the county of Surrey for their neglect in not completing the militia; but, the deficiency in the Surrey Militia can be proved to have arisen from the inadequacy of the Militia Bill, a bill brought in by the Right Honourable Secretary himself. Some of the counties have, indeed, completed their regiment of militia, while Surrey, out of 2,200 men, or thereabouts, has not embodied above 700. This is a shameful defalcation; but the fault lies with the government and not with the magistrates of the county, who are as intelligent, as zealous, and as active as the magistrates of any county in the kingdom. It may be convenient, but it is not over just, for ministers to lay their own faults upon the shoulders of the magistrates. Every magistrate in Surrey was included in the sweeping charge of the Secretary at War, who, if he had given himself time to reflect, must have perceived, that their arduous and disinterested labours deserved from the government something very different from harsh and opprobious language.——The truth is, that every thing relating to the military defence of the country has constantly been put off so long before it has come before parliament, that, when, at last, it has come, there has not been time to bestow on it a proper degree of consideration; and every measure has thus been hastened along without receiving any of the benefits, which might otherwise have been derived from legislative discussion. The last bill, I mean the bill for a general enrollment, and for a partial training, should have been before the House of Commons for a month, at least; whereas, it came in of a Monday, and it be-

came a law the Monday following. Thus passed how should an act be perfect? How should it approach near to perfection?

IRELAND is said to be tranquil. We hope it is so; but we beg leave to caution our readers against the assertions, which the ministers and their Irish partizans may make on this subject. They have, for these eighteen months past, been boasting of the state of tranquillity and contentment, produced in Ireland, by the peace of Amiens. When people objected to the peace, the reply was, that, whatever opinions might be entertained with regard to Great Britain, "all the world "must allow that peace was absolutely ne- "cessary to the *tranquillity of Ireland*." Mr. Ogle, during the debate on the treaty, said, that "there was not a man of *loyalty* in Ire- "land, who did not receive the tidings of "peace with joy and satisfaction, and, on "the contrary, not a *rebel* or *disaffected in- "dividual*, who did not receive it with "*disapprobation* and *regret*." Whence the Chancellor of the Exchequer modestly concluded, that Mr. Windham and his friends "were *countenanced* in their opposition by "the opinions of the *disaffected*, and that, so "far as their feelings were hurt at the "peace, *their feelings were in unison with "those of the United Irishmen* *."——These silly vapourings about the tranquillity of Ireland were renewed at the commencement of the present session of Parliament. It was in adverting to some of them that Mr. Elliot said, "he saw nothing to make him be- "lieve, that Buonaparté would neglect to "avail himself of any seditious combina- "tions, which might exist either in England "or in Ireland;" and, said he, "it must "be admitted, that the *intercourse of peace "is calculated to mature a system of organiza- "tion with greater facility than it could have "been carried on in war*."† This notion was reprobated by the ministry and their Irish members, who all declared, that the seeds of discontent were totally destroyed in Ireland. There has, then, been a rapid growth since the 24th of November last! But, the fact is, and we have it from authority, on which we can rely, that the government is now in possession of positive proof, that the rebellion, which has lately broke out in Ireland, was planned *during the peace*, and in *conjunction with persons acting immediately under the government of France*. Nor have we any doubt, that Despard's conspiracy might easily have been traced to the same source; but, at that time, the ministers were in hopes of prolonging the duration of their peace, and, for that reason, they kept out of sight the connexion between Buonaparté and the traitors in London.—With regard to the conduct of the government, as relating to the Irish rebellion, every day brings forth fresh proof of remissness, of downright carelessness, or of total incapacity. Had we read, in some legend, of rebels having *secreted*, within the bounds of a city, thousands of stands of arms, clothing for ten thousand men, pieces of ordnance, and a powder mill, we might have borne the relation, as a bold stretch of the romantic; but it is past all bearing to hear the same thing related as having actually taken place under a government, in the *vigilance* of which we are, nevertheless, told to place *implicit confidence!*

THE FORTIFYING OF LONDON has become the topic of discussion in the House of Commons. It was no longer ago than the 23d of June last, that Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Addington represented almost as a sort of treason the supposition that an invading army would ever reach London. These two persons, together with Mr. Sheridan and another or two that could be mentioned, do, if the news-paper statements be correct, make it a constant practice to misrepresent Mr. Windham. On the occasion, to which I now more particularly allude, that Rt. Hon. Gentleman, having before heard it advanced, as a maxim not to be departed from, that, if the enemy landed, battle must be given him before he reached London; having heard this from an authority of weight, he thought it his duty to say, that he hoped no such maxim would be imposed on the commander of the army; because, circumstances might be such as to render a battle, so given, the means of *losing the country altogether*, to which it certainly would be preferable to see the enemy in London. He did not state, that it was *likely* for the enemy to reach the capital: the utmost amount of his observations was, that the enemy might *possibly* reach it; yet, did the news-papers ascribe to the two persons aforementioned speeches abounding with the most furious assault upon him; they were made to represent him as *disheartening* the people, and as endeavouring to render the exertions of government *useless*; and Lord Castlereagh was made to assert, that, if the enemy advanced so far from the coast as to expose London to an attack, the people of this country *must be the most base and cowardly of mankind*. After hearing such language from the lips of the King's prime minister, and from one of his principal coadjutors,

* See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1190 and 1191.

† See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1680.

had not the parliament and the people a right to be astonished and offended at the Official Note from Lord Catchcart to the Lord Lieutenant of Middlesex, a document by which the nation and the whole world are informed, that, if an enemy should land, he may possibly and even *probably* march to London, and that, therefore, London ought to be fortified, and that arrangements for that purpose ought to be made "*without an* "*hour's delay?*"—The same Note, however, which talked of *arrangements*, talked about "*postponing the completion*" of the works intended to be raised. The *completion* of a work is generally postponed till the said work is *begun*. But, a truce to all criticisms on this Note, which, without any disrespect to the noble author, I must declare to be one of the most incorrect and unintelligible productions that I ever had the mortification to peruse; and, his lordship will have the goodness to excuse me, if I express my serious concern, that any portion of the army, which is destined to defend the liberties of my country and the throne of my Sovereign, should be liable, in the hour of emergency, to receive orders couched in the same ambiguous and inexplicable style.—The principal point to be ascertained in the meaning of Lord Cathcart's Note, was, whether the fortifications to be made round the cities of London and Westminster, were intended to be begun immediately, or whether the beginning of them was to be postponed, till the enemy was actually upon the coast. The latter appearing to be the intention of government, Colonel Craufurd brought the subject before the House of Commons, on the 2d instant, when, at the close of a very long and very able speech, he moved the following resolution: "That, it now ap-
" pears to be in the contemplation of His
" Majesty's government to erect works in
" the neighbourhood of London, lest an
" enemy should, by any extraordinary for-
" tune of war, be able to approach the me-
" tropolis; That it is the opinion of this
" House, that such a precaution will be wise
" and expedient, but that the efficacy of
" this, and other measures of the same de-
" scription, in different parts of the king-
" dom, must materially depend on the works
" being erected before the disembarkation of
" an enemy shall have actually taken place;
" and, That this House will most chearfully
" concur in granting to His Majesty such
" powers, and in making good such expen-
" ses, as may be found necessary for the
" most effectual and speedy accomplishment
" of these important objects." After a long debate, embracing a variety of topics, the motion was withdrawn. Never, surely, was any thing more reasonable than the opinion contained in this resolution. As to the scite, the nature, or the extent of the works proposed to be erected round the metropolis, or rather, proposed to be *talked about*, I shall only say, that, if His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief has, agreeably to the assertion of Lord Cathcart, really "directed
" his *thoughts* to the *consideration* of this sub-
" ject;" if he has finally determined that these two cities are to be defended by lines, works and batteries, sweeping round a circumference of *forty miles*; if this be the determination of His Royal Highness, why, then, it is my determination to say no more about that matter, but to confine myself to the point of *time*, when these, or any works, ought to be erected. The ministers very prudently cleared the galleries of the House of Commons upon the utterance of the first sarcastic sentence from the lips of Colonel Craufurd. He began his speech by explicitly stating, that he should carefully abstain from saying any thing, which might be supposed to convey intelligence to the enemy, of which, to say the truth, ministers thought much less, than of the intelligence, which they knew he would convey to the press, trelative to their ignorance and procrastination.—The *time* required to make fortifications agreeably to the plan of Lord Cathcart would be about *ten years*; but works, such as a person like Colonel Craufurd would approve of, might be rendered useful in a few weeks, and be completed more at leisure. If ever the French reach London, or its neighbourhood, it must be in a very few days, not more than five or six at the utmost, after they make a landing on the coast. What fortifications can be raised in the space of six days? But, the Secretary of War, who, from the name of his office, one would expect to understand some trifle on this subject, proposed to wait till the enemy was seen to draw out his ships or boats ready for the expedition; just as if by any thing in the appearance of the French vessels opposite Havre, Dunkirk, or Flushing, we should be able to discover, the precise route, by which the army on board those vessels would make its first approaches against London!. But, suppose this were the case; we should then have but *eight* days wherein to erect our fortifications; and, with the news of the enemy upon the coast, with the women and children frightened half to death, with all the mercantile wealth in jeopardy, with a general desire in every man to get a few pounds worth of hard money in exchange for bank-notes or for goods, in the

midst of all the alarm, bustle and confusion that would, at such a time, prevail through the metropolis and its environs, whence would come the men to make redoubts and batteries? Lord Cathcart does, indeed, say, that "the necessary *guns* and *troops* to guard "and defend the works have been *calcula-* "*ted*, as well as the *number of hands* neces- "sary to complete *them* within a given pe- "riod;" but, without quarrelling with his lordship's grammar, I am afraid, that, if he puts off the commencement of his works till intelligence be received of the enemy's approach, he will find that, as to "the number "of hands necessary to complete them," he has reckoned without his host. — Of all propensities the propensity to *procrastinate* is the worst that a minister can possibly have, more especially at times like the present. With this ministry, however it is not this thing nor that thing, but every thing, which is put off to the last moment. "Better late than never," is a saying much more common than true; for, in many instances, the very reverse is the truth, and it may be safely asserted, as to works round London, "better never than late;" because an attempt to erect them, after the approach of the enemy should be announced, would only add to the distress and confusion of the time, and would with hold a part, at least, of the strength, which, otherwise, might be employed against him.—But, why does the Parliament amuse itself with questions about the time of fortifying London? Why do they not institute an inquiry into the conduct of those, who have reduced the country to the disgraceful necessity of having recourse to such means of defence for its metropolis? This is the object of rational inquiry; for, if the conduct of the ministers be justifiable, *then* are all attempts to save the country totally useless. There can now be no ground for clamour against those who shall propose going into the inquiry of which I am speaking: the ministers have had time enough to prepare for the defence of the country as well as for their own defence; the people are ready to do their part; but when double taxes are laid on them, when absolute necessity places their persons in a state of requisition, when they are told to lie upon their arms, when the enemy is at their doors, an enemy whom till now they have been taught to despise; when they are in such a situation, foolish and base indeed must they be if they do not inquire into the *cause* of their disgrace, and if they do not endeavour to remove that cause at the same time that they prepare to save themselves from its fatal effects. "Let us not ask *who is the minister,* "but *where is the enemy,*" is a maxim that may be very convenient for a minister, who has rendered it necessary to fortify London and Westminster, or, for a person who can condescend to seek for emoluments by flattering such a minister; but, with men of a different stamp, and I trust that a very great majority of the men of England are of a different stamp, such a maxim will be rejected with disdain. The minister, is, as to the whole of a war, the commander in chief; and, shall we not, when we are about to engage in a battle, which, every one allows, is to decide the fate of our country; shall we not, because the danger is great, ask *who is the general?* And if we find him to be a person, under whose command we have hitherto been led on from error to error, from danger to danger, from disgrace to disgrace, are we not to endeavour to change him, and to put ourselves under the command of another? "But, "stop: give the ministers time: let us see "how they will get us out of the war."—See how they will get us out of the war! Have we not seen how they got us out of the last war, and how they got us out of their own peace? Give them time! Have we not already given them time enough? Time to reduce us lower than ever nation was reduced in a like peroid? Have we not waited till they have suffered rebels to erect powder-mills in Dublin, and till they call us to fortify London? Stop! Have we not stopped? Have not our patience and our forbearance already been stretched to an extent, which brands us with the mark of folly the most egregious, or of submissiveness the most vile? What consolation shall we derive from the fall, or even from the punishment, of the ministers, after our country has been invaded, after London has been burnt? Unanimity! The people *are* unanimous in the resolution to defend their country against the dangers that threaten it; but, are they, for that reason, to shut their eyes and to hold their tongues as to the conduct of those who have produced that tremendous danger? Of all the instances of assurance exhibited by the present ministers their pretension to the merit of the public unanimity is the most intolerable. As well might the idle and groveling wretches, who set fire to the Abbey Church, and who had well nigh destroyed the tombs of our kings, have boasted of the zeal and alacrity which *their* conduct drew forth! But, the claim of the ministers is, if possible, still more preposterous: they assume to themselves the praise due to the accomplishment of what has been accomplished, not only

without their aid, but *in opposition to their wishes and their efforts*. If the nation lives, it will live by their disappointment. Whatever there is of evil, in the present state of things, is their work: whatever there is of good has been produced in spite of them. If this statement be correct, as, I think, no one will deny it to be, it is the duty of every man, while he earnestly endeavours to resist and to chastise the enemy, to neglect no lawful and practicable means of endeavouring to procure the dismission of those ministers, who have exposed his country and the throne of his Sovereign to such imminent danger.

COUNCIL OF WAR. An establishment of this sort has long been wished for by the most intelligent men in the country. Colonel Crauford, during his speech of Tuesday last, dwelt on the subject for a considerable time, and, after his motion was withdrawn, MR. FOX proposed the measure in the following motion: "That an address "be presented to his Majesty, praying "that he would be graciously pleased to "appoint a Military Council, consisting of "General Officers, and such others as to "his Majesty shall seem fit, for the purpose "of giving their advice when called upon "by his Majesty respecting the defence of "the country, and of being consulted occa-"sionally, or from day to day, if necessary, "by the Commander in Chief, and his Ma-"jesty's Ministers upon that important "subject."—The House was divided upon this motion, the *ayes* were 40 and the *noes* 63. Why the ministers should oppose this motion, it is difficult to surmise, unless they are ashamed, which is not very likely, to submit their mole-like labours to the revision of wise and experienced men. The public are told, that the Commander in Chief has already, in fact, a council of war; but, it appears, that this council of war consists of persons, who have active commands, and who, of course, are, or ought to be, *in the field*. The materials, whereon the Royal Duke's Council of war is said to work, are, it seems, collected together in the Quarter Master Generals's Office; but, if Lord Cathcart's Note was drawn thence, few persons of sense will be much inclined to expect any great good from that source. The truth is, that the ardent zeal of his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief leads him to attempt the performance of more than any human being is capable of performing. This is a subject, on which it would be improper to be very minute; but, at a time like the present, at a time when arrangements are making for drawing round us a line of circumvallation, we cannot refrain from urging the necessity of more military science and experience, or, at least, of more capacity of dispatching business, than can possibly be possessed by any one man in the world.

THE PRINCE has, it appears, applied to the minister for a military command, and has received no answer to his application. The minister, being questioned upon this subject, stated to the House of Commons, on Tuesday last, "that his Royal Highness "had made a most handsome and gallant "tender of his services, and," said he, "having said this, I must declare, that nothing "but the positive commands of his Majes-"ty, or the united commands of a majority "of this House, shall ever draw from me "another word on the subject."——This declaration was right enough, on the part of the minister; but, those who think that his Royal Highness ought to be permitted to have a distinguished share in the honour of defending the kingdom, which is his inheritance, and the people over whom he is destined to reign, have a right to require, *at the hands of the minister*, why this honour is with-held from his Royal Highness, while his Royal Brothers are all invested with considerable commands; why this slight is thrown upon the Prince of Wales; why, at a moment when it is esteemed a disgrace to be inactive, when all are stirring, from the King to the peasant, why, at such a moment, the badge of inactivity is attached to the heir apparent to the throne; why, in short, his Royal Highness is thus deprived of an opportunity of signalizing himself in that way which is the most likely to endear him to those who must one day be his subjects. At the hands of *the minister* the reason for this invidious and injurious exclusion is now demanded by all loyal men, and will, we trust, ere long be demanded by the Houses of Parliament.

POSTSCRIPT.

I shall next week publish a letter to MR. SHERIDAN, in which I shall take notice of what that gentleman has thought proper to say about me, in a place where he knows I cannot reply to him. I propose to enter somewhat at length into the character, conduct, and views of this Treasury convert.

WM. COBBETT.

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